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Abstract: 
Unequally-distributed resources, whether people’s income or competence, are ubiquitous in our 
real world. Whether to promote competition or to lead to a more equal environment is often in 
question in societies or organizations. With heterogeneous endowments, we let subjects 
collectively choose whether to have a competitive lottery contest - where only one individual in a 
group wins and receives an award, generating a greater income inequality - or to have a public 
good that benefits the less-endowed to a greater degree. Our data indicates that highly-endowed 
individuals contribute little when the public good is selected. The majority of subjects, however, 
vote in favor of having a public good, contrary to the standard theory predictions. In addition, a 
belief elicitation task shows that they expect payoffs to be more equally distributed under the 
public good regime than under the contest regime. Moreover, the subjects’ preferences between 
the two regimes are little affected by their risk attitudes or the size of awards in competition. 
These suggest that people’s institutional choices are driven more by their income inequality-
averse preferences. 
JEL classification: C92, D04, D63, D74, H41 





1.  Introduction 
The prevalence of heterogeneous resources − the unbalanced distribution of incomes or 
capacities in people − is one of the most fundamental features of organizations and societies (e.g., 
Stiglitz 2012, Piketty 2014). For example, there are wide income gaps and differences in the 
living standards within a society. The Gini coefficient of household disposable incomes is on 
average 0.31 even in OECD countries.
1
 Similarly, in organizations, the performance and 
competence of workers is diverse even if they have similar work experiences, which may create 
salary gaps among them. Although the heterogeneity of resources has some positive aspect, it 
also has negative aspects. On the one hand, the heterogeneity of resources may contribute to 
efficiency as it stimulates competition among people. But on the other hand, it often results in 
serious intra-group conflicts because of the inequality. We then face a difficult collective 
decision to make: whether to promote competition for the sake of efficiency or to lead to a more 
equal environment by offering some redistribution mechanism even though efficiency may be 
sacrificed.    
For instance, in a firm, wage inequality may be helpful in securing or attracting highly 
skilled workers, but it may decrease work motivation among low-skilled workers and may also 
result in disharmony among workers in interdependent work (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen 1998, 
Trevor et al. 2012). Although incentive schemes such as tournaments that are used in firms may 
contribute to higher productivity of workers and thus more efficiency in managing a firm in the 
management’s view, such competition may lead to uncooperative behaviors among workers. 
Treatments to compress pay inequality or their heterogeneous competence, such as voluntary 
mentoring and education programs, may help them maintain harmony; but these treatments may 
demotivate high-skilled workers if they want high compensations. For another example, income 
inequality increases anti-social behavior such as violent crime in societies (e.g., Kelly 2000). 
Voluntary activities in charitable organizations are supported through the reduction of the tax 
requirement in order to alleviate poverty in a society, which would help shrink the income gap 
and create a more fair society; but it may displease those with wealth who would lead the 
economic growth of the society as they cannot enjoy the benefits. Also, the presence of such 
redistribution mechanisms may reduce people’s incentives to work.  
                                                             
1  See OECD Factbook 2013 (DOI : 10.1787/18147364). 
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Therefore, whether to promote competition for efficiency, though it may exacerbate 
conflicts, or to lead to a more equal environment and support the less-privileged is often in 
question in situations where resources vary by people. In the recent decades, economists have 
actively studied people’s collective institutional choices using laboratory experiments. However, 
despite the tremendous impact that the results of collective choices may have on societies or 
organizations as mentioned above, little attention has been paid to how people collectively 
choose between competitive and cooperative institutions within a group when there exists 
heterogeneity in their endowments.  
Exploring behavioral principles for people’s collective choices on this topic is not 
straightforward, however. First, past extensive experiments have found that some individuals 
have other-regarding preferences such as inequality aversion (see Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a 
survey). For example, some of the individuals may enjoy some higher non-material gains if their 
payoffs are similar to each other. Therefore, we cannot infer their institutional choices only from 
their material incentives. Second, recent experiments show that egalitarian subjects − those who 
prefer fair distribution of payoffs − are more likely to stay away from competitive environments 
in real-effort experiments (e.g., Bartling et al. 2007, Balafoutas et al. 2012).
2
 The more 
egalitarian preferences they have, the less likely they may be to support competitive institutions. 
The voting decisions of the egalitarian individuals nonetheless may depend on the degree of 
material incentives under the competitive regime. A person, even if she is strongly income 
inequality averse, might support a competitive institution if her potential benefits from 
competition are sufficiently high. In addition, their voting decisions may also depend on their 
assigned endowments as their material or non-material incentives differ by the endowment. 
Third, a rich experimental literature has found that in situations where their resources are 
unbalanced, those vested with larger (smaller) resources behave more (less) selfishly (e.g., 
Buckley and Croson 2006, Chan et al. 1996, Cherry et al. 2005, Maurice et al. 2013). This 
tension between the higher and lesser endowed members may be severe enough for them to 
collectively choose a more competitive environment if there is such an opportunity.  
We conduct an experiment in order to study people’s collective institutional choices 
between a competitive scheme versus a public good that helps the less-endowed more when their 
                                                             
2
 The subjects made choices between a tournament and a piece rate scheme in these two papers.  
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resources are unequally distributed. A novel feature of our experimental design is to let subjects 
collectively select one from two fundamentally different institutions under each of which the 
same endowments can be used. Group size is five. Endowments are unbalanced across subjects; 
they are randomly assigned to them at the onset of the experiment. Specifically, one member 
receives an endowment of 50 points, two members receive that of 20 points and the remaining 
two receive that of 10 points. Each group then collectively chooses one out of two regimes by 
voting: a public good regime and a competitive lottery contest regime. A group has a social 
dilemma when it collectively implements a public good. Under this regime, each member makes 
allocation decisions between their private account and public account using their own 
endowments. They get one point for each point they allocate to their private account. The total 
contributions to their public account are doubled and are then redistributed among the members. 
The distribution rule is that the smaller endowment they have, the more they receive from the 
public account. By contrast, members compete for an award of 50 points or 110 points if a group 
selects a lottery contest regime. Under this regime, each member decides how many points they 
allocate to their lottery accounts. The more points a subject assigns to the account the more likely 
she is to win the competition and receive the award. Only one member wins the competition in 
the contest regime. Their interaction under a collectively selected regime is one-shot.
3
 Their 
beliefs on the allocation decisions of the other four group members under collectively selected 
regimes and their risk attitudes are elicited in order to explore driving forces behind their 
institutional choices. 
As consistent with findings of related studies, our data indicates that a significantly 
smaller proportion of the subjects with the highest endowment, compared with the other subsets 
of the subjects, contribute positive amounts to the public account in the public good regime. 
However, surprisingly, around 70 to 80% of the entire subjects prefer having a public good, 
contrary to the standard theory assumption of all being selfish. The percentages of the subjects’ 
support for a public good are little affected by the size of award (50 or 110) in the other regime. 
Moreover, a comparison of the distributions of realized payoffs within groups indicates that the 
average Gini coefficients in the public good regime are significantly smaller than those in the 
lottery contest regime. An exploration of the subjects’ beliefs reveals that they also on average 
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 This experimental setup is used to obtain data without reputation effects. 
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believe that their payoffs are more equally distributed in their groups if a public good regime is 
selected. Furthermore, we also find that the subjects’ risk attitudes are statistically similar 
between those who vote for a public good and those who vote for a lottery contest. These results 
suggest that the subjects’ collective institutional choices are driven more by their income 
inequality-averse motives. This implies that people may collectively decide not to implement a 
competitive policy if it enlarges inequality among the members when their resources are 
unequally distributed even if it can be an efficiency-enhancing policy on the whole. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design. 
Section 3 provides the theoretical predictions and hypotheses. Section 4 reports results, and 
Section 5 discusses our results and concludes. 
2.  Experimental Design 
The experiment consists of two phases. The first phase is a stage in which endowments 
are randomly given to subjects. The second phase is a voting decision stage followed by an 
allocation stage. Subjects collectively make one-time policy implementation decisions and 
individual allocation decisions in Phase 2. Our study consists of (a) two main treatments in 
which either a public good or a lottery contest is endogenously selected by subjects’ votes and 
(b) one control treatment in which a public good is exogenously imposed in Phase 2 (Table 1).  
At the onset of Phase 1, subjects in all treatments are randomly assigned to a group of 
five individuals. We use a partner-matching protocol: the group composition does not change 
between Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 1 plays a role in generating an unequal distribution of 
endowments among members. In each group, one subject receives 50 points, two subjects 
receive 20 points, and the remaining two are given 10 points. The assignment of endowments is 
random: the probabilities with which they receive 50, 20 and 10 points are 1/5, 2/5 and 2/5, 
respectively. We refer to the set of subjects who are given 50, 20 and 10 points as their 
endowments as Sets H, M and L, respectively.  
 In the two main treatments, the Low and High treatments - dubbed L and H, Phase 2 
begins with subjects’ voting decisions concerning whether to create a public good or to 
implement a lottery contest, contingent on two voting rules: an equal and a weighted voting rule 
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(see Section 2.2). Subjects subsequently submit their beliefs on the other members’ voting 
decisions. In order to avoid a hedging problem, the belief elicitation task is not incentivized. Also, 
we do not tell subjects about the presence of the elicitation task at the onset of the experiment.
4
 
After that, the computer randomly assigns one of the two voting rules for each group. A public 
good or a lottery contest is then collectively implemented in accordance with the result of their 
votes; and each subject makes an allocation decision under a selected regime as explained in 
Section 2.1. (In the control treatment, which is called the Exogenous Public Good treatment, 
subjects do not vote on the two regimes; they make contribution decisions based on their 
endowments to their groups’ public goods.) Once all subjects complete their allocation decisions, 
they submit their beliefs on the other four members’ allocation decisions before being informed 
of the outcomes of the allocation stage. As in the first belief elicitation task, this elicitation task 
is also not incentivized. However, at the end of the experiment, just before they are informed of 
the outcome of the allocation decisions, all subjects are asked to answer incentivized questions 
concerning their risk attitudes (see Section 2.3).
5
 Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of the experiment. 
We will explain each piece of the design in details below. 
2.1. Two Possible Regimes: The Target of Collective Choices 
The public good, one of the options of the vote, corresponds to goods and services, such 
as voluntary mentoring or education programs for employees in corporations, poverty alleviation 
programs in international organizations, or some redistribution mechanisms in societies. If a 
public good is created in a group, then each subject in the group simultaneously makes an 
allocation decision between their private account and the public account. Their contributions 
must be integers between 0 and their own endowments (50, 20 or 10). As usual in voluntary 
contribution game experiments, a subject gets one point for each point that she allocates to her 
private account. The allocation to the public account, by contrast, is doubled and redistributed 
among members: 25% of the amounts are given to each of the two Set L subjects, 20% of them 
are given to each of the two Set M subjects and 10% of them are given to the Set H subject (note 
that 25%  2 + 20%  2 + 10% = 100%) . In other words, the distribution rule is that the less 
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 They are instead told that some additional questions related to the experiment may be asked while the experiment 
is in progress and that their responses to these questions will not affect their payoffs. 
5
 They are not told about the presence of this task at the onset of the experiment. They are instead told that some 
additional questions unrelated to the main part of the experiment may be asked. 
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resource a member has, the more the member receives from the public account. This 
redistribution rule is often prevalent in the real world. For example, such funds in international 
organizations are often used to help less-developed countries. In a society, various policies such 
as public welfare assistance are generally used to help the poor. In a firm, voluntary “buddies” 
programs tend to help less-skilled workers more than highly skilled workers. 
Suppose that a public good is put in place in a group and a member having an endowment 
   contributes    to the public good. Then, her payoff, πi, is expressed as follows: 
                   
 
   , (1) 
where       if subject i is a Set H subject;       if subject i is a Set M subject; and        
if subject i is a Set L subject. The first term,      , refers to the payoff of subject i from her 
private account. 
By contrast, when a lottery contest is collectively implemented in a group, subjects 
compete with the other four members for an award. Specifically, each member in the group 
simultaneously decides an allocation amount to their lottery account. The award is 50 points (110 
points) and the competition is low (high) in the L treatment (the H treatment). Only one member 
in the group receives the award. Each subject in this regime can increase the probability of 
winning the competitive battle by raising their allocation amounts to their lottery account. 
Suppose that subject i makes an investment of xi out of his endowment Ei and also that the other 
four members allocate X-i in total to their lottery accounts. Then, subject i’s probability of 
obtaining the award is 
  
      
. xi must be non-negative and less than or equal to her endowment 
(Ei). When all five members allocate nothing (i.e.,      for all i), then the award is randomly 
given to one of the members (i.e., each receives it with a probability of 20%). They receive their 
remaining points after investment, Ei − xi, as a part of their payoff. The competition in the lottery 
contest is also prevalent in our real world. For example, in organizations, workers’ capacities or 
resources vary by employee as in our paper; and the more efforts they exert, the more likely they 
are to get promoted to a higher position. The chances of promotion, however, would negatively 
depend on the contributions of other workers in the firm as higher-ranked positions are limited. 
In competitions across countries for research and development, the chances that a national 
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company succeeds in developing a new technology ahead of other companies depends on its 
relative investment amount of resources.  
 Once all subjects make their allocation decisions under one of the two regimes, they are 
asked about their beliefs on how other members made allocation decisions. Specifically, a Set H 
subject is asked about his or her beliefs on the average allocation of the two Set M subjects and 
that of the two Set L subjects in her group. A Set M (Set L) subject is asked about his or her 
beliefs on (a) the allocation of the Set H subject, (b) the allocation of the other Set M (Set L) 
subject and (c) the average allocation of the two Set L (Set M) subjects in her group. These 
elicited beliefs are used in analysis to calculate each subject’s perceived (expected) payoff under 
their collectively implemented regime. This information would be helpful in understanding 
causes of their individual voting decisions as discussed in Sections 3 and 4.  
2.2. Voting Rules 
Our study lets subjects vote under the two voting rules: a weighted voting rule and an 
equal voting rule and assesses the effects of voting power on their collective institutional choices 
as an additional analysis.
6
 This analysis is conducted as it is shown that collective institutional 
choices may differ by voting rule. For instance, Markussen, Reuben and Tyran (2014) have 
experimentally found that efficiency-enhancing inter-group competitive scheme is more likely to 
be selected in a set of three groups when an equal voting rule (i.e., a voting rule that imposes a 
policy if the majority of the three group members support it) is used, relative to when a group 
veto rule (i.e., a rule that imposes a policy if the majority of each group supports it) is used. 
Collective outcomes may differ by voting rule in our study as well because subjects’ voting 
decisions may be affected by the heterogeneity of their endowments, considering that their 
incentives (material or non-material) under each regime may differ by the amount of 
endowments they are given. 
In the L and H treatments, at the onset of Phase 2, subjects vote on whether to have a 
public good or a lottery contest for each of the two scenarios: (1) the equal voting rule is used 
and (2) the weighted voting rule is used. After all subjects complete their decisions, they are 
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 Weighted voting rules are often used in organizations or societies (e.g., Leech 2002, Rapkin and Strand 2006). 
Examples include collective decision-making in IMF and IBRD or in shareholder meetings of a corporation. 
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subsequently asked about their beliefs concerning how the others in their groups voted before 
they are informed of its collective outcomes.
7
  The two voting decisions are incentive compatible. 
Once all subjects submit their voting decisions and the subsequent questions on their beliefs, the 
computer assigns either the equal or weighted voting rule for each group with a probability of 
50% each. Then, one of the two voting decisions made by each subject is cast as their vote.
8
  
When the weighted voting rule is assigned to a group, the voting power of subject i is Ei/110.  
Here, 110 yields from 50 + 20 + 20 + 10 + 10 (the sum of endowments in a group). 
Consequently, the distribution of voting power among the members is unequal: the more 
resources a subject has, the more his or her vote influences the outcome. The voting power of the 
Set H subjects is the largest. However, it is not possible for them alone to decide the adoption of 
the policy by their votes, as their voting power equals 50/110, which is not greater than 0.5, in 
their groups. Therefore, the votes cast by the subjects belonging to the Sets M and L also 
influence each group’s collective decision, although they influence the result of their collective 
decision less than those of the Set H subjects do. When the equal voting rule is assigned to a 
group, then, the voting power is one-fifth for each subject. Hence, the standard majority rule 
determines each group’s regime, either a public good or a lottery contest. 
2.3. Elicitation of Risk Preferences 
 Once all subjects submit their beliefs on the other four members’ allocations to either a 
public account or a lottery account, they are subsequently asked to answer questions concerning 
risk attitudes. The questionnaire on risk attitudes consists of the ten questions used in Holt and 
Laury (2002). We include this task in order to study whether their voting preferences between 
the two regimes are affected by their risk attitudes as discussed in Section 3.  
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 For example, each Set M subject is asked about their beliefs on the voting decision made by their Set H subject, the 
decision made by the other Set M subject, and the decisions made by the two Set L subjects for each of the two 
voting rules. 
8
 This kind of strategy method is commonly used when there is a need to obtain incentive-compatible decisions 
under each of many possible conditions. For example, in Fehr, Herz and Wilkening (2013), who study the value of 
individual decision rights in a principal-agent framework, a principal first decides whether or not to delegate a 
decision right to an agent; and then, before the principal and the agent are informed of the delegation decision, both 
players choose their effort levels as well as their beliefs about their matched partners’ effort levels, contingent on 
whether they have a right to decide, using a strategy method. In Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2011) and Kamei 
(2014), who study the impact of endogenous decision-making on people’s pro-social behavior, all subjects make 
voting decisions on implementation of a policy before implementation conditions are assigned to their groups. After 
their voting decisions, the computer randomly assigns either an endogenous or exogenous condition to each group. 
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3. Theoretical Predictions 
 A group has a collective action dilemma if a public good is selected in that group. This is 
because the MPCR (marginal per capita return) is     , which is less than 1 for each subject, as 
shown in Eq. (1). Therefore, according to the standard theory, contributing nothing to their 
public account is a strictly dominant strategy for each group member. The Set H, Set M and Set L 
subjects obtain 50 points, 20 points and 10 points, respectively, as their payoffs under Nash 
Equilibrium (NE).  
By contrast, if a lottery contest is collectively implemented in a group, then the group 
members can enjoy some gains, regardless of whether they are risk averse. Suppose that each 
member in a group is risk neutral. Then, the utility function of a subject is proportional to his or 
her expected payoff. The expected payoff of subject i,      , is calculated by: 
               
  
      
 .  (2) 
Here, z = 50 (110) in the L (H) treatment.  Under this assumption, we find that each member, 
regardless of their endowment, chooses to allocate 8 points to their lottery account in order to 
maximize their expected payoff in the L treatment (see Appendix A.1). They can raise their 
expected payoff by 2 points in equilibrium in the L treatment. Optimal allocation amounts differ 
by their endowment in the H treatment. The Set H, Set M and Set L subjects allocate 21 points, 
20 points and 10 points, respectively, to their lottery accounts in equilibrium. As a result, the 
probability of winning the competitive battle is the highest (the lowest) for the Set H subjects 
(Set L subjects). Their expected payoff of each category of subjects is higher in equilibrium in 
the H treatment than in the L treatment (see Table 1). The standard theory therefore predicts that 
subjects prefer to have the lottery contest in both the L and H treatments under the assumption of 
the risk-neutral preference. 
 The advantage of the lottery contest over the public good does not change even if we 
instead assume that subjects are risk-averse. This is because they can allocate amounts as small 
as possible to the lottery accounts and also because there is also an option for them to at least 
keep their own endowments by allocating nothing to the accounts but at the same time still have 
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a chance of receiving an award in case all of the other four members allocate zero points to the 
lottery accounts. 
Prediction 1: Standard Theory Predictions 
Subjects allocate nothing to their public accounts when public goods are imposed in their groups. 
By contrast, they enjoy positive expected gains when lottery contests are imposed. They therefore 
vote in favor of having a lottery contest in their groups. 
 However, experiments in recent decades have found that people have other-regarding 
preferences, such as income inequality aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000) and reciprocity (e.g., Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and 
Fischbacher 2006). These preference models predict that some subjects contribute positive 
amounts to their public accounts and thus some of them enjoy payoffs higher than their own 
endowment amounts under the public good regime. As a result, their preferences between the 
two regimes may be different from Prediction 1. Suppose that subjects have income inequality-
averse preferences. For simplicity, we assume that subject i has the following utility function: 
                  
 
   
        
  
   .  (3) 
Here,    is utility weight of subject i on inequality and N is group size (N = 5).
9
 Subjects are 
assumed to be heterogeneous:    differs by subject. As illustrated in Appendix A.2, the mutual 
full free-riding equilibrium (i.e.,      for all i) no longer occurs for broad ranges of  . 
Moreover, the income inequality-aversion model predicts that more Set H subjects, relative to 
Set L subjects, allocate positive amounts to their public accounts regardless of the decisions of 
the Set L or Set M subjects as the endowments of the Set H subjects are much higher than those 
of Set L subjects. The inequality-averse model also suggests the conditional cooperative behavior 
of the Set L subjects and the Set M subjects. This is because the Set L subjects (the Set M 
subjects) do not like inequality between themselves and the other Set L subjects (the other Set M 
subjects) or the Set M subjects (the Set L subjects). It is also because the Set L subjects (the Set 
M subjects) want to avoid having inequality with the Set H subject when Set L subjects (Set M 
subjects) obtain high payoffs thanks to the others’ decisions.  
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 A similar utility function is used in Chen and Kamei (2014). The use of a quadratic form, instead of the prominent 
functional form proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), is due to its tractability.  
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 In the lottery contest regime, only one individual in a group wins a large award (50 or 
110). A subject therefore can incur a large utility loss resulting from a greater income inequality 
in this regime if   is high enough. Thus, this model predicts that some subjects - strongly 
inequality-averse subjects (i.e., those with sufficiently large  ) - vote for a public good. 
Prediction 2: Predictions Based on the Income Inequality-Averse Preferences 
(a) Strongly income inequality-averse subjects contribute positive amounts to their public 
accounts. (b) More Set H subjects, relative to Set L subjects, contribute positive amounts to their 
public accounts, regardless of the decisions of the Set M and Set L subjects. (c) The contribution 
decision of a Set L subject (a Set M subject) is conditional, dependent on the contributions of the 
others: it is positively propositional to his or her beliefs on the contribution decision of the Set H 
subject, the contribution decision of the other Set L subject (the other Set M subject), and the 
average contribution decision of the two Set M subjects (the two Set L subjects). (d) Those with 
sufficiently large   vote in favor of a public good, rather than a lottery contest. 
 Note that reciprocity models also predict that some subjects allocate positive amounts to 
their public accounts and that therefore some of them vote in favor of the public good. Their 
motive of cooperation with other members is different, however: it is positive reciprocity 
resulting from kind intentions of the other members. The reciprocity models therefore predict 
strong conditional cooperative behavior of the Set H subjects that is similar to that of the Set M 
and Set L subjects. 
 There is alternative possibility that subjects’ risk preferences drive their institutional 
choices even when subjects have social preferences. The distribution of a subject’s possible 
payoffs substantially differs between the two regimes. The range of his or her possible payoffs is 
larger in the lottery contest regime: a higher payoff is possible, but they obtain nothing from their 
lottery accounts if they lose the competition. Especially, the lottery contest regime in the H 
treatment generates a higher expected return but is very risky as the subjects need to allocate 
more amounts to their lottery accounts in order to win the competition as shown in Table 1. Even 
if they achieve high enough expected payoffs in the lottery contest regime that are comparable to 
those in the public good regime, more risk-averse subjects may vote in favor of the public good.  
Prediction 3: Risk Preferences and Voting Decisions 
13 
 
More risk-averse (risk-loving) subjects vote for a public good (a lottery contest).  
 We can test Prediction 3 by using the elicitation task regarding risk attitudes (Holt and 
Laury 2002). This task consists of ten questions, each of which asks subjects to choose an option 
between a risky lottery and a safe lottery. We use the number of risky options chosen by a 
subject (which we denote as r  {0, 1, 2, …, 10}) as a proxy of his or her risk preference. If 
Prediction 3 holds, then the average r of those who vote for a public good should be significantly 
smaller than that of those who vote for a lottery contest. 
 Nevertheless, Prediction 3 may not hold, as subjects under the public good regime may 
incur some additional psychological cost when the other members do not contribute to their 
public accounts, and they may therefore want to avoid having the public good. This cost stems 
from people’s betrayal-averse preferences and would not be present under the contest regime. 
Some recent studies find that people are less likely to take a risk by sending money to their 
matched trustees in trust games, compared with their risk-taking behavior in structurally identical 
decision tasks (e.g., Bohnet et al. 2008, Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004). Even a subject whose 
preference is shown to be strongly risk-averse by the risk elicitation task may vote in favor of a 
lottery contest regime if his risk premium due to betrayal aversion is sufficiently high. 
4. Results 
 Ten sessions, four per each of the two main treatments and two for the control treatment, 
were conducted at University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in April and May, 2014. The 
experiment was programmed in ztree (Fischbacher 2007). Almost all subjects were 
undergraduate students there. They were recruited via solicitation emails using a recruiting 
website, ORSEE (Online Recruitment System For Economic Experiments). No subjects 
participated in more than one session. No communication was allowed during the sessions. 
Experimental sessions lasted on average one to one and a half hours, and subjects earned on 
average $22.39 (part of it was a participation fee of $5) for their participation. Neutral framing 
was used in all instructions and experiments.
10
 In this section, we overview the subjects’ 
institutional choices and their subsequent allocation decisions. At the same time we explore the 
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 For instance, the terms “group fund” and “allocation” were used instead of “public good” and “contribution,” 
respectively, in the public good regime. Instructions are available from the author upon request. 
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driving forces that are behind these decisions using data from additional tasks, such as their 
beliefs on the other members’ allocation decisions. 
 Table 2 reports subjects’ voting decisions and their collective vote outcomes. We find 
that a strikingly large portion of subjects, more than 70% of them in total, voted for a public 
good under each of the two voting rules, contrary to Prediction 1, which was based on standard 
theory (see the “Total” row in Table 2). The high percentages of support for a public good are 
statistically similar between the L and H treatments, even though their expected payoffs 
predicted under the other voting option (a lottery contest) substantially differ between the two 
treatments as shown in Table 1. In addition, the subjects’ voting decisions are little affected by 
voting rule.
11
 The last observation is not surprising as even in the weighted voting rule the voting 
power of the Set H subjects is less than 50% and a vote cast by any category of subjects affects 
their collective decisions to some degree.  
 A closer look at the voting data reveals that around half of the Set H subjects prefer 
having the public good whereas a larger fraction of the Set L or Set M subjects vote for the 
public good in both the L and H treatments. A regression analysis, shown in Appendix Table B.1, 
confirms that the smaller endowment the subjects are assigned, the more likely they are to vote 
for a public good.
12
 The significantly different distribution of individual votes by endowment 
leads to a significant difference in their collective vote outcomes between the equal and weighted 
voting rules. We find that a public good regime is significantly more likely to be collectively 
chosen with the equal voting rule than with the weighted voting rule.
13
 
Result 1: Voting Decisions and Collective Vote Outcomes 
Around 70% to 80% of the subjects vote for a public good. The smaller endowments that they are 
assigned, the more likely they are to vote for a public good. Public goods are more likely to be 
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 The number of votes for a public good under the equal voting rule (102 out of 140 votes) is not significantly 
different from that under the weighted voting rule (98 out of 140 votes) according to a two-sample z-test of 
proportion (p-value = .597, two-sided). 
12
 The regression analysis also indicates that female subjects are significantly more likely than male subjects to vote 
for a public good in the H treatment, but not in the L treatment. The lottery contest in the H treatment is more 
competitive due to a high award (z = 110). The result that women tend to stay away from competition is consistent 
with the findings of past studies (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). 
13
 The number of vote outcomes having a public good under the equal voting rule (24 out of 28 cases) is 
significantly different from that under the weighted voting rule (17 out of 28 cases) according to a two-sample z-test 
of proportion (p-value = .347, two-sided). See the hyp. columns in Table 2. 
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collectively selected under the equal voting rule. The subjects’ voting decisions are little affected 
by voting rule or by the size of award (50 or 110). 
 A plausible cause that may account for Result 1 is that people have some other-regarding 
preferences and believe that their members also do so as we discussed in Section 3. If this is the 
case, the payoffs from the public good regime that subjects believe they would obtain may be 
higher than their payoffs predicted by the standard theory under that regime and even higher than 
those in the lottery contest regime indicated in Table 1. Fig. 2 reports the average of subjects’ 
perceived payoffs under their collectively selected regimes. Here, a subject’s perceived payoff is 
calculated by using her own allocation decision and her beliefs on the other four members’ 
allocation decisions.
14
 As shown in Appendix Table B.2, for the majority of the subjects in the L 
treatment of the public good regime, their perceived payoffs from the public good regime exceed 
not only their own endowment amounts (   in Fig. 2) but also their expected equilibrium 
payoffs calculated under the contest regime if selected (   in Fig. 2).15 The same does not hold 
for the subjects in the H treatment, however. Although the perceived payoffs in the public good 
regime are higher than    for almost all subjects and they also exceed    for the majority of the 
Set L subjects, they are not higher than    for all of the Set H subjects and for around half of the 
Set M subjects.  
A comparison between the subjects’ perceived payoffs between the two regimes also 
provides a clear difference in their material incentive between the subjects (Appendix Table B.3). 
The Set L subjects on average believe that they would receive significantly higher (expected) 
payoffs under the public good regime in both of the L and H treatments. By contrast, the Set M 
subjects on average believe that they would obtain higher expected payoffs under the lottery 
contest (public good) regime in the H (L) treatment. The Set H subjects on average believe that 
their expected payoffs would be higher under the lottery contest regime in the H treatment; but 
their perceived payoffs are almost identical between the two regimes in the L treatment. These 
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 Eq. (1) or (2) is used for this calculation. For instance, a Set M subject’s perceived payoff in the public good 
regime is calculated by:               
       
     
  . Here,    is the contribution of the Set M 
subject, and   
 ,   
 , and   
  are the Set M subject’s beliefs on the contribution of the Set H member, the contribution 
of the other Set M member, and the average contribution of the two Set L members, respectively. 
15
 Contrary to this result, the average perceived payoff of the Set H subjects in the public good regime is less than 52 
in the L treatment (Figure 2(a)). This is due to one Set H subject who contributed his or her full endowment to the 
public account and had a very low perceived payoff. 
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results explain a part of Result 1 (the smaller endowments subjects are assigned, the more likely 
they are to vote for a public good); as those vested with smaller endowments, unlike the Set H 
subjects, on average believe that they would be materially better-off under the public good 
regime. However, despite the clear difference in the material incentive, the subjects’ actual 
voting decisions, including the ones by the Set H subjects, are surprisingly very similar between 
the L and H treatments. This intriguing observation suggests that individuals’ voting decisions 
are not merely driven by the level of their own (expected) perceived payoffs.  
Result 2: Perceived Payoffs between the Two Regimes 
In the L treatment, the Set L and Set M subjects, but not the Set H subjects, believe that they 
would obtain significantly higher (expected) payoffs under the public good regime than under 
the lottery contest regime. By contrast, in the H treatment, the Set H and Set M subjects (Set L 
subjects) believe that they would obtain significantly higher expected payoffs under the lottery 
contest (public good) regime. 
 Another look at the subjects’ decisions reveals that their allocation decisions also differ 
by their endowment. First, we find that a significantly smaller proportion of the Set H subjects, 
relative to the Set M or Set L subjects, contribute positive amounts in the public good regime (see 
Fig. 3 and Appendix Table B5).
16
 This contradicts Prediction 2(b) and cannot be explained by 
the income inequality-averse model. Moreover, this also cannot be explained by the differences 
between the Set H subjects and the Set M or L subjects in their beliefs on the contribution 
decisions of the other members: the differences are not statistically significant for most of the 
comparisons (Appendix Table B.6).
17
 This result is, however, consistent with the well-known 
experimental evidence that subjects’ allocation amounts are positively dependent on their 
MPCRs (e.g., Fisher et al. 1995, Zelmer 2003). The MPCR of the Set H subjects (Set L subjects) 
is the lowest (highest) as shown in Eq. (1). In addition, this is consistent with the findings of past 
studies showing that those vested with higher (lower) endowments cooperate less (more) in 
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 The levels of contributions are very similar between the three categories of the subjects in the L treatment due to 
the fact that one Set H subject contributed his or her full endowment. The average contribution of the Set H subjects 
(3.36) is insignificantly smaller than that of the Set M subjects (6.36) or that of the Set L subjects (5.32) in the H 
treatment. 
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public goods games when their endowments are heterogeneous (e.g., Buckley and Croson 2006, 
Chan et al. 1996, Cherry et al. 2005, Maurice et al. 2013). 
Result 3: Contribution Decisions in the Public Good Regime 
The significantly smaller proportion of the Set H subjects, relative to that of the Set M and Set L 
subjects, contribute positive amounts to their public accounts.  
Second, the subjects under the lottery contest regime allocate the amounts that are smaller than 
the ones indicated in Table 1 (based on standard theory predictions under the risk neutral 
preference) to their lottery accounts for competition (see Appendix Table B.8). This implies that 
they are on average risk-averse. Despite their attempts to avoid receiving smaller payoffs in case 
of losing a competition by allocating smaller amounts for the contest, overall characteristics of 
the equilibria under risk-neutrality stay the same. We find that their allocation amounts to the 
lottery accounts are similar among the different subsets of the subjects (Set H, M or L) in the L 
treatment. We also find that the average allocation amounts by the Set H subjects (Set L subjects) 
are the highest (lowest) in the H treatment. 
 The distributions of realized payoffs are similar to those of perceived payoffs except for a 
few differences (Appendix Fig. B.1 and Table B.4). The Set H subjects are materially better off 
in the H treatment if a lottery contest regime is collectively selected. By contrast, despite Result 
3, the Set L subjects enjoy higher payoffs in both of the L and H treatments if a public good 
regime, instead of a lottery contest regime, is collectively selected. 
 Returning to the subjects’ voting decisions, around half of the Set H subjects prefer 
having a public good regime, rather than a lottery contest regime, in both of the main treatments 
(see Table 2). Thus, Result 3 seems to be a puzzle as we would reasonably expect that the 
subjects may behave more pro-socially if their voting decisions stem from their social 
preferences such as income inequality aversion. Then, what drives Result 1? Although we 
obtained Result 3 as in other related studies, it turns out that, except for this aspect, our subjects’ 
collective institutional choices and behaviors are better explained by the inequality-averse model, 
compared with alternative hypotheses, as discussed as follows. First, we observe strong 
conditional cooperative behavior under the public good regime for the Set M and Set L subjects, 
as consistent with Prediction 2(c). That is, their contribution decisions are positively proportional 
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to their beliefs on the (average) allocation decisions of the Set M and Set L subjects (see 
Appendix Table B.7). This resonates with the idea that subjects are income inequality-averse 
agents and prefer a situation with a smaller inequality in payoffs through their mutual 
cooperation. 
Result 4: Conditional Cooperation Behavior 
The contribution decisions of the Set M and Set L subjects are positively dependent on their 
beliefs about the (average) contribution decisions of the Set M and Set L subjects. 
 Second, we observe that the subjects’ collective institutional choices, either a public good 
or a lottery contest, determine the degree of income inequality within their groups. Fig. 4(b) 
reports the average Gini coefficients of the subjects’ realized payoffs within a group by regime in 
each treatment. Remarkably, the Gini coefficients in the lottery contest regime are on average 
65% and 135% higher than those in the public good regime in the L and H treatments, 
respectively. A Mann-Whitney test finds that the former is significantly higher than the latter in 
each treatment (see Appendix Table B.9). The clear difference in the degree of inequality again 
resonates with the idea that the subjects’ income inequality-averse motives drive their collective 
choices for a public good regime.   
 Third, the interpretation of our results by the subjects’ income inequality-averse 
preferences holds even if we instead use “perceived” Gini coefficients. Each subject’s “perceived” 
Gini coefficient can be calculated, as their believed distribution of payoffs in their group can be 
computed based on their own allocation decision and beliefs on the decisions of the other four 
members, using Eq. (1) or (2). The subjects’ perceived Gini coefficients are useful especially for 
understanding their beliefs on inequality when making their voting decisions. A comparison of 
the perceived Gini coefficients between the two regimes provides a clear pattern: the average 
perceived Gini coefficients are significantly smaller under the public good regime in both of the 





Result 5: Gini Coefficients by Regime 
Gini coefficients, whether the realized distributions of payoffs in groups or the subjects’ 
perceived distributions of payoffs before making voting decisions, are significantly smaller under 
the public good regime than under the lottery contest regime in both of the L and H treatments. 
 An alternative cause that may be responsible for the subjects’ collective institutional 
choices, besides the inequality aversion, is their risk attitudes (see Section 3). However, our data 
does not support Prediction 3. The average risk attitudes (r) are not significantly different 
between the supporters of a public good and those of a lottery contest for each of the Sets H, M 
and L subjects, regardless of the size of awards in the contest regime (see Appendix Table 
B.10).
18
 This suggests that it is more reasonable for us to interpret our subjects’ voting decisions 
as their dislike for an unequal distribution of payoffs among the members. 
Result 6: Risk Attitudes by Treatment 
Prediction 3 does not hold. Risk Attitudes (r) are not significantly different between those who 
vote for a public good and those who vote for a lottery contest for each category of the subjects. 
 Lastly, we note that there is a possibility that the subjects’ institutional choices may be 
affected by the effects of the endogenous process. Recent research has found that democratic 
decision processes may raise people’s pro-social behavior through a number of ways including 
the effects of signals sent through voting and the democracy premium (e.g., Dal Bó et al. 2010, 
Tyran and Feld 2006, Kamei 2014). We could therefore expect that the presence of the 
endogenous process may drive their votes for the public good, assuming that some subjects have 
non-standard preferences and may enjoy a higher level of mutual cooperation when the public 
good regime is endogenously imposed. As shown in Appendix Table B.11, we find that the more 
the Set M and L subjects (the Set L subjects) expect the other members to vote for a public good, 
the more likely they are to vote for it in the L (H) treatment. In addition, for most categories of 
subsets, the supporters of a public good regime contribute larger amounts, relative to the 
supporters of a lottery contest regime; although the differences in the average contribution are 
significant only for some comparisons. This suggests that some subjects may prefer to 
collectively implement the public good and to achieve mutual cooperation. These endogenous 
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 Also see Appendix Table B.1. 
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effects alone do not explain the subjects’ collective institutional choices, however. The average 
contribution under the public good regime is actually slightly lower in the two endogenous 
treatments than in the Exogenous Public Good treatment (see Fig. 3). This suggests that the 
effects of signals and the democracy premium are not the most important factors that drive their 
institutional choices in the experiment.  
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 This paper provides the first experimental evidence concerning people’s collective 
choices between a policy that helps less-endowed to a greater degree − a public good regime − 
and a policy that promotes competition − a competitive lottery contest regime, in a situation 
where the resources of individuals are unequally distributed. In the experiment, around 70% to 
80% of the subjects in total prefer having a public good in their groups, contrary to the standard 
theory predictions. Moreover, remarkably, the subjects’ preferences for the public good are little 
affected by the size of award in the other option, competitive lottery contest regime. A closer 
look at our data reveals that the subjects’ institutional choices are well supported by the 
predictions based on income inequality-averse preferences except one aspect: the contribution 
decisions of the Set H subjects to a public good. The distributions of payoffs within groups − not 
only the realized distributions but also their believed distributions before making voting 
decisions − are more equal for the public good regime than the lottery contest regime. Our data 
does not support alternative hypotheses that suggest other driving forces behind the subjects’ 
collective institutional choices. That is, the subjects’ decisions cannot be explained by their risk 
attitudes or the effects of the endogenous decision process.  
 One may wonder how people make decisions if the incentives of competition are much 
higher. Do they still prefer having a public good rather than a competitive lottery contest? One 
may suspect that our results on the subjects’ institutional choices are because the awards were 
not large enough under the competitive lottery contest regime. One may speculate that if the 
return on competition is sufficiently high, then the majority of people, especially those who are 
willing to take risks, may choose the competitive environment. If this speculation is true, risk 
preferences, not income inequality aversion, may be the most important driving force behind 
their collective institutional choices in such environment. The advantage of the Set H subjects 
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particularly increases as their endowments are the highest. The Set H subjects may therefore 
prefer a competitive lottery contest regime more if the award is sufficiently high. To gauge 
robustness of our main findings to a very high award under the lottery contest regime, we 
additionally conducted two sessions by raising the size of award from 110 to 220 while keeping 
all of the experimental setups in the main treatments as they are. Under the lottery contest regime 
with an award of 220, the equilibrium strategies based on the risk-neutral preference are: xH = 50, 
xM = 20 and xL = 10; and their expected payoffs are: πH = 100, πM = 40 and πL = 20. These 
payoffs are much higher than those in the L and H treatments (see Table 1). Notice that the 
subjects’ strategic uncertainty in the public good regime stays the same in this additional 
treatment as that in the L and H treatments (the return and the degree of competition rise only in 
the lottery contest regime). Therefore, if people’s risk aversion is an important driving force of 
our results, risk-loving subjects would be more likely to vote for a competitive contest in the 
additional treatment, compared with the L and H treatments.
19
 Consequently, risk attitudes must 
be significantly different between those who vote for the public good and those who vote for the 
lottery contest in this additional treatment, considering that the risk attitudes are statistically 
similar between them in both of the L and H treatments. 
 Strikingly, the subjects’ voting preferences in the additional treatment are similar to those 
of the L and H treatments as shown in Appendix Table B.12. Although the proportion slightly 
decreases, the majority of the subjects still vote in favor of a public good. The result that around 
43% of the Set H subjects still vote for a public good is consistent with Bartling et al. that find 
people have strong aheadness-averse preferences when self-selecting their environment. Their 
risk attitudes, however, are not significantly different between the supporters of the public good 
and of the lottery contest. Although the Set H subjects on average contribute a significantly 
smaller percentage of their endowments under the public good regime compared with the Set L 
subjects, the Gini coefficients, whether ex-ante perceived or realized distributions of payoffs, are 
in fact significantly different between the two regimes. These results well support our conclusion 
in that the subjects’ collective institutional choices in our environment are strongly driven by 
social preferences such as income inequality aversion.  
                                                             
19
 This should be the case even if some kind of betrayal aversion is prevalent under the public good regime. This is 




 Lastly, our paper has two important implications regarding people’s collective 
institutional choices. First, our study suggests that people’s income inequality-averse motives 
may be strong enough to drive their collective institutional choices away from competitive rules. 
This means that a competitive scheme may not be collectively implemented in a society or an 
organization even though it may generate higher efficiency (i.e., a higher total payoff for a 
group), relative to an alternative with a public good aspect. Second, recent papers including 
Ertan et al. (2009), Kamei et al. (forthcoming) and Putterman et al. (2011) show that efficiently-
enhanced rules that may materially benefit all members equally are more likely to be collectively 
selected when an equal voting rule is used because the majority of assenting votes outperform 
some fractions of perverse dissenting votes. Our results intriguingly finds that efficiently-
enhancing competitive policies may be less likely to be imposed with an equal voting rule 
(compared with a weighted voting rule) when there is an alternative with a public good aspect if 
the population’s income inequality-averse preferences are sufficiently strong and the efficiency-
enhancing rule generates a greater inequality among people.  
 As a final remark, we note that in reality societies or organizations combine policies that 
promote competition and that mitigate inequality unlike our simpler setup. The mixture of 
different policies has been considered to be important by researchers. For example, Lazear 
(1989) has proposed that when relative performance evaluations of workers are used in a firm, 
pay inequality among them should not be too large. The competitive policy prevents the 
demoralization of high-skilled workers while the less unequal wage structure prevents workers 
from engaging in uncooperative behavior. An experimental investigation concerning how people 
construct institutions when both kinds of policies can be combined remains as an area for future 
research. 
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Fig. 1: Schematic Diagram of the Experimental Design 
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Table 1: Summary of Main Treatments 
         








Standard theory predictions under the risk neutral preference 
(a) Allocation decisions (b) Payoff (c) Voting  
decisions Public good Lottery contest Public good Lottery contest 
         
[Main Treatments]        
L (Low) 50 points 4 15 (75) ci = 0 
for all i 
xi = 8 
for all i 
πH = 50 
πM = 20 
πL = 10 
πH = 52 
πM = 22 
πL = 12 
All members 
vote for contest 
H (High) 110 points 4 13 (65) ci = 0 
for all i 
xH ≈ 21 
xM = 20, 
and xL = 10. 
πH = 50 
πM = 20 
πL = 10 
πH = 57.5 
πM = 27.2 
πL = 13.6 
All members 
vote for contest 




      ---- 2 6 (30) ci = 0 
for all i 
---- πH = 50 
πM = 20 
πL = 10 
 ---- 




 Allocations to the public account are doubled and redistributed to group members. ci is the contribution of subject i to her public account. xi is the 
allocation of subject i to her lottery account.   ,   , and    are the payoffs of Set H, Set M and Set L subjects, respectively.
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Table 2: Voting Decisions and Outcomes 
(1) Individual Conditional Voting Decisions 
 
 
 Treatment          category 
    
Number of Votes Percentage 
 under EV1 under WV1 under EV under WV 
     
      
L treatment Set H subjects Public good 8 8 53% 53% 
 
 
Lottery contest 7 7 47% 47% 
 Set M subjects Public good 23 21 77% 70% 
 
 
Lottery contest 7 9 23% 30% 
 Set L subjects Public good 21 23 70% 77% 
 
 
Lottery contest 9 7 30% 23% 
 
      
 Subtotal Public good 52 52 69% 69% 
 
 
Lottery contest 23 23 31% 31% 
             
 
     
H treatment Set H subjects Public good 8 6 62% 46% 
 
 
Lottery contest 5 7 38% 54% 
 Set M subjects Public good 21 20 81% 77% 
 
 
Lottery contest 5 6 19% 23% 
 Set L subjects Public good 21 20 81% 77% 
 
 
Lottery contest 5 6 19% 23% 
 
      
 Subtotal Public good 50 46 77% 71% 
 
 
Lottery contest 15 19 23% 29% 
 
      
 
      
Total 
 
Public good 102 98 73% 70% 
 
 
Lottery contest 38 42 27% 30% 
             
 
(2) Collective Vote Outcomes 
  






Number of groups  Percentage  
  
 







 actual hyp. actual hyp. actual hyp. 
  









 L treatment Public good 4 12 6 10 80% 80% 60% 66.7% 
  Lottery contest 1 3 4 5 20% 20% 40% 33.3% 
  




 H treatment Public good 4 12 7 7 100% 92.3% 78% 53.8% 
  Lottery contest 0 1 2 6 0% 7.7% 22% 46.2% 
  









 Total Public good 8 24 13 17 89% 85.7% 68% 60.7% 
  Lottery contest 1 4 6 11 11% 14.3% 32% 39.3% 
  







 The numbers in the EV (WV) columns in Panel (1) indicate the ones of individual voting decisions under the 
equal (weighted) voting rule. The numbers in the EV (WV) columns in Panel (2) indicate the ones of collective outcomes 
under the equal (weighted) voting rule.
 2 
The columns labeled actual indicate realized vote outcomes in groups where the 
equal or weighted voting rule was randomly assigned in the experiment. 
3
 The numbers in the hyp. columns under EV 
(WV) are the sums of (a) the numbers of realized collective outcomes under EV (WV) and (b) the numbers of unrealized 
collective outcomes based on subjects’ unused votes under the EV (WV) in groups where the WV (EV) was assigned.  
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Fig. 2: Average Perceived Payoffs by Endowment and Regime 
(a) The L treatment 
 
(b) The H treatment 
 
Notes: πp (πL) are the payoffs under the public good (the lottery contest) based on the standard theory predictions 
with the risk-neutral preference. A subject’s perceived payoff is calculated based on his or her own allocation 
decision and beliefs on the decisions of the other four members. The figures of average realized payoffs by 
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Fig. 3: Average Contribution Decisions in the Public Good Regime 
 
Notes: Each number in this figure is calculated by: 100∙(the average contribution in the category)/(their 
endowments). Each of the “all subjects” bars is calculated by: 100∙ (the average contribution of all subjects in the 











all subjects set H set M set L
exo. public good treatment L treatment H treatment
32 
 
Fig. 4: Average Gini Coefficients of the Subjects’ Payoffs by Regime 
          (a) For perceived distributions of payoffs            (b) For realized distributions of payoffs 
 
Notes: Each bar in figure (a) indicates the average perceived Gini coefficient across subjects. Specifically, we first 
calculated each subject’s (i) own perceived payoff and (i) perceived other four members’ payoffs based on his or her 
allocation decision and beliefs. Eq. (1) or (2) were used in calculating the payoffs. We then calculate each subject’s 
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Appendix A: Theoretical Predictions 
A.1. Standard Theory Predictions in the Lottery Contest Regime: Optimal Allocations under 
the Assumption of the Risk-Neutral Preference 
a. The L treatment:  
 Each subject in a group maximizes his or her expected payoff expressed in Eq. (2). 
Suppose that the solutions are interior. Then, the first-order condition (FOC) reduces to: 
 
      
   
    
     
         
  . (A.1) 
Thus, each group member’s best response is given by: 
    
      
     
  
       
     
   
   for a Set H subject. (A.2) 
    
     
    
     
  
      
    
     
   
   for a Set M subject. (A.3) 
    
     
     
    
  
      
     
    
   
   for a Set L subject. (A.4) 
Here,   ,   , and    are allocations to the lottery accounts by Set H, Set M and Set L subjects, 
respectively. Conditions (A.2) to (A.4) imply that   
    
    
   . Under this equilibrium, 
the expected payoffs of the Set H, Set M and Set L subjects are 52, 22 and 12, respectively. 
 There are no corner solutions. For example, suppose that   
    ,   
     and    
  
  . Then, (A.2) and (A.3) imply that   
    
 . As 
      
   
   at      , along with condition 
(A.2) we get:   
    . However, the left hand side of condition (A.2) is negative for any   
  
such that   
    , contradicting that   
  is the solution to (A.2). We likewise obtain a 
contradiction if we assume any other corner solution; the details are omitted to conserve space. 
b. The H treatment:  
 We first show that there are no incentives for each member to change their strategy from 
(  
 ,   
 ,   
 ) = (21, 20, 10) in order to prove that this is an equilibrium. 
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 First, regarding the Set H subject, all we need to check is to compare    between two 
strategies:       and      , as 
      
   
    
       
     
  
       
     
   
    
      
       
 
 is 
decreasing in    and 
      
   
 is positive at       but negative at      .       is the best 
strategy for the Set H subject since                                                 = .0063 
> 0. 
 Second,       is the best response for a Set M subject given that   
    ,   
     
(the decision of the other Set M subject)  and   
    . This is because 
      
   
    
               
               
 
 is decreasing in   , and 
      
   
 is positive at      .  
 Lastly,       is the best response for a Set L subject as well. Note that 
      
   
    
               
                
 is decreasing in   , and 
      
   
 is positive at      .   
 Any other corner solution or an interior solution cannot be an equilibrium. We obtain a 
contradiction if we assume any other corner solution. The details are omitted to conserve space. 
As for the possibility of interior solutions, suppose that   
    ,   
     and   
    . Then, 
each group member’s best response is given by: 
    
       
     
  
       
     
   
   for a Set H subject. (A.5) 
    
      
    
     
  
      
    
     
   
   for a Set M subject. (A.6) 
    
      
     
    
  
      
     
    
   
   for a Set L subject. (A.7) 
Conditions (A.5) to (A.7) imply that   
    




. The best strategy of each subject is 
either 17 or 18 as   
 ,   
   and   
  are integers. This contradicts the constraint that   
    .  
 At (  
 ,   
 ,   
 ) = (21, 20, 10), the expected payoffs of the Set H, Set M and Set L 




A.2. Predictions Based on the Income Inequality-Averse Preferences 
Suppose that the utility function of each subject is expressed as in Eq. (3). This subsection of 
Appendix illustrates a possibility that some subjects allocate positive amounts to their public 
accounts in equilibrium. For simplicity, we assume that the two Set M subjects each contribute 
the same amounts to their public account, and that the two Set L subjects also each make the 
same contribution decisions in equilibrium. 
Proposition A1: Suppose that    
 
   
. Also suppose that the contribution decision of a Set M 
subject (Set L subject) is the same as that of the other Set M subject (Set L subject). Then, some 
subjects in the group allocate positive amounts to their public account in equilibrium.  
Proof: The utility functions of a Set H subject, a Set M subject and a Set L subject are: 
         
 
 
     
     
      
     
  . 
         
 
 
    
     
     
     
      
     
  . 
         
 
 
    
     
      
     
     
     
  . 
Here,   ,   , and    are the payoffs of Set H, Set M and Set L subjects, respectively. These are 
expressed as in Eq. (1). 
   
   
, 
   
   
, and 
   
   
, given the other subjects’ strategies, are each calculated 
as: 
   
   
                        
       
  .  (A.8) 
   
   
                
              
        
  . (A.9) 
   
   
                  
        
                
  . (A.10) 
Here,   ,   , and    are the contributions made by a Set H, Set M and Set L subjects, respectively. 
Suppose that   
    
    
    in equilibrium. Then, 
   
   
           at     , which 
contradicts the assumption that   
    is the best response strategy for the Set H subject.  ■ 
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 Eq. (A.8) indicates that the Set H subject allocates positive amounts to his public account 
even if    is relatively small. This is because the term in the curly bracket is always a large 
positive number (i.e., greater than 70) for any values of   
  and   
  when   
   . By contrast, Eq. 
(A.10) implies that only if   
  and   
  are high enough that          
        
   , 
   
   
   
at      
    for sufficiently high   . The condition          
        
    restricts the 
feasible set of   
  and   
 . For example,   
     and   
    (each of which is 40% of his or her 
endowment) do not satisfy this condition. This observation suggests that more Set H subjects 
contribute positive amounts to their public accounts than Set L subjects do, provided that the 
distributions of individual types are the same between the Set H subjects and the Set L subjects. 
Proposition A2: More Set H subjects contribute positive amounts to their public accounts, 
compared with the Set L subjects. 
 Eq. (A.8) to (A.10) give us a prediction concerning subjects’ conditional contribution 
decisions in the public good regime. First, the higher   
 ,   
  and   
  are, the more Set L subjects 
contributes positive amounts to their public account. Notice that if the Set H subject, the two Set 
M subjects and the other Set L subject contribute large positive amounts, then a Set L subject 
receives relatively large payoffs, possibly payoffs even higher than the two categories of subjects 
in case that   
  and   
  are sufficiently high. More income inequality-averse Set L subjects 
themselves then contribute positive amounts. Second, likewise, the higher   
 ,   
  and   
  are, the 
more Set M subjects contributes positive amounts to their public account. Third, conditional 
cooperative behavior is weak for the Set H subjects. The coefficients of   
  and   
  are tiny in Eq. 
(A.8). This results from the experimental setting where the Set H subjects have much higher 
endowments, and they have greater income inequality in their groups unless they contribute 
positive amounts to their public accounts. We therefore obtain the following predictions based on 
this consideration. 
Proposition A3: The contribution amounts of the Set L subjects (the Set M subjects) are 
positively propositional to their beliefs on the contribution amounts of the Set H subjects, the 
contribution amounts of the other Set L subjects (the other Set M subjects), and the average 
contribution amounts of the Set M subjects (the Set L subjects). Unlike the Set M or Set L 
6 
 
subjects, the contribution decisions of the Set H subjects are almost not related to the decisions 
of the other two categories of the subjects.  
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Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures 
Fig. B.1: Average Realized Payoffs by Endowment and Regime 
(a) The L treatment 
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all subjects set H set M set L
Public good lottery contest
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Table B.1: Determinants of Individual Votes in each Treatment (Supplementing Table 2 of the 
paper) 
 
Dependent variable: A binary variable which equals 1 if a subject voted in favor of a 
public good under a randomly assigned voting rule; 0 otherwise. 
 
   
Independent Variable L treatment 
(1) 
H treatment 
 (2)  
   
   




   




   






   




   
Constant 2.54*** 1.25 
 (0.86) (0.96) 
   
# of Observations 75 65 
Log likelihood -40.65 -30.82 
LR Chi-squared 7.65 8.59 
Prob > LR Chi-squared .1052 .0722 
Pseudo R-squared .0860 .1223 
   
 
Notes: Probit regressions. The general political orientation variable takes an integer between 1 and 7 (1 = very 





Table B.2: Summary of the Subjects’ Perceived Payoffs in the Public Good Regime 
(supplementing Fig. 2 of the paper) 
(a) The L treatment 
        
 
Total # of 
subjects in the 
public good 
regime 
# of those whose perceived payoffs 
in the public good regime exceed 
their Nash Equilibrium payoffs 
under the public good regime (50, 
20 or 10) 
# of those whose perceived payoffs 
in the public good regime exceed 
their Nash Equilibrium payoffs 
under the lottery contest regime (52, 
22 or 12) 
  
 
    
    
Set H subjects 10 8 (80.0%) 7 (70.0%) 
Set M subjects 20 20 (100.0%) 19 (95.0%) 
Set L subjects 20 20 (100.0%) 18 (90.0%) 
    
Total 50 48 (96.0%) 44 (88.0%) 
  
 
    
 
(b) The H treatment 
        
 
Total # of 
subjects in the 
public good 
regime 
# of those whose perceived payoffs 
in the public good regime exceed 
their Nash Equilibrium payoffs 
under the public good regime (50, 
20 or 10) 
# of those whose perceived payoffs 
in the public good regime exceed 
their Nash Equilibrium payoffs 
under the lottery contest regime 
(57.5, 27.5 or 17.5) 
  
 
    
    
Set H subjects 11 9 (81.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
Set M subjects 22 22 (100.0%) 10 (45.5%) 
Set L subjects 22 22 (100.0%) 20 (90.9%) 
Total 55 53 (96.4%) 30 (54.5%) 
  
 





Table B.3: Perceived Payoffs in the Public Good Regime and in the Lottery Contest Regime 
(supplementing Fig. 2 of the paper) 
(a) The L treatment 
 
All subjects Set H subjects Set M subjects Set L subjects 
Public Good Regime
1
 31.0 (50) 51.2 (10) 28.7 (20) 23.1 (20) 
Lottery Contest Regime
1
 23.1 (25) 51.1 (5) 20.3 (10) 11.8 (10) 
p-value (two-sided) .0006*** .2678 .0001*** .0004*** 
 
Notes: Mann-Whitney tests. 
1 
The numbers are average perceived payoffs. The numbers in parenthesis are the numbers 
of subjects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
Results: The average perceived payoff is statistically similar between the public good regime and the 
lottery contest regime for the Set H subjects. By contrast, the average perceived payoffs are 
significantly higher in the public good regime than in the lottery contest regime for the Set M 
subjects and the Set L subjects.  
 
(b) The H treatment 
 
All subjects Set H subjects Set M subjects Set L subjects 
Public Good Regime
1
 31.53 (55) 52.0 (11) 26.8 (22) 26.1 (22) 
Lottery Contest Regime
1
 30.9 (10) 64.1 (2) 32.7 (4) 12.7 (4) 
p-value (two-sided) .8060 .0297** .031** .0054*** 
 
Notes: Mann-Whitney tests. 
1 
The numbers are average perceived payoffs. The numbers in parenthesis are the numbers 
of subjects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
Results: The average perceived payoffs are significantly higher in the lottery contest regime than in 
the public good regime for the Set H subjects and the Set M subjects. By contrast, the average 




Table B.4: Realized Payoffs in the Public Good Regime and in the Lottery Contest Regime 
(supplementing Appendix Fig. B.1 in the Appendix) 
 
(a) The L treatment 
 
All subjects Set H subjects Set M subjects Set L subjects 
Public Good Regime
1
 28.1 (50) 49.6 (10) 24.9 (20) 20.5 (20) 
Lottery Contest Regime
1
 25.8 (25) 63.2 (5) 24.1 (10) 8.90 (10) 
p-value (two-sided) .0360** .9021 .0858* .0005*** 
 
Notes: Mann-Whitney tests. 
1 
The numbers are average realized payoffs. The numbers in parenthesis are the numbers 
of subjects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 
(b) The H treatment 
 
All subjects Set H subjects Set M subjects Set L subjects 
Public Good Regime
1
 27.3 (55) 52.0 (11) 24.3 (22) 18.0 (22) 
Lottery Contest Regime
1
 34.2 (10) 140.0 (2) 8.75 (4) 6.75 (4) 
p-value (two-sided) .0067*** .0288** .0028*** .0017*** 
 
Notes: Mann-Whitney tests. 
1 
The numbers are average realized payoffs. The numbers in parenthesis are the numbers 





Table B.5: The Difference in the Contribution Decision across the Three Categories of the 
Subjects in the Public Good Regime  
(1) The Percentages of Subjects that Contributed Positive Amounts  
 
The L treatment The H treatment 
The Percentages of Subjects that Contributed Positive Amounts 
(i) Set H subjects 30.0% 45.5% 
(ii) Set M subjects 75.0% 90.9% 
(iii) Set L subjects 70.0% 77.3% 
p-value (two-sided)1  
(i) vs. (ii) .0177** .0041** 
(i) vs. (iii) .0371** .0676* 




 Two-sample tests of proportions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at 
the .01 level, respectively. 
(2) Contribution Amounts as Percentages of their Endowments (supplementing Fig. 3 of the 
paper) 
We compared the contribution amounts as percentages of their endowments between any two 
subsets of subjects (e.g., Set H versus Set L) by using Mann-Whitney tests. 
(2a) The L treatment 
 
Set H subjects 
vs. Set M subjects  
Set H subjects 
vs. Set L subjects  
Set M subjects 
vs. Set L subjects  
p-value (two-sided) .0239** .0285** .500 
  






(2b) The H treatment 
 
Set H subjects 
vs. Set M subjects  
Set H subjects 
vs. Set L subjects  
Set M subjects 
vs. Set L subjects  
p-value (two-sided) .0009*** .0022*** .0778* 
 
Notes: Mann-Whitney tests. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, 
respectively. 
 
Result: The Set H subjects on average contribute a significantly smaller fraction of their 
endowments to their public accounts, compared with the Set M or Set L subjects, in each of the L 
and H treatments. The Set M subjects on average contribute an insignificantly (weakly 




Table B.6: Average Beliefs on the Contribution Decisions of the Other Four Members in the 
Public Good Regime 
(a) The L treatment 
(a1) Average Beliefs by the Row Subjects 
 
The contribution by 
the Set H subjects 
The (avg.) contribution 
by the Set M subjects 
The (avg.) contribution 
by the Set L subjects 
(i) Set H subjects --- 9.30 6.60 
(ii) Set M subjects 10.8 7.95 6.95 
(iii) Set L subjects 6.50 9.45 5.50 
Mann-Whitney Tests1   
(i) vs. (ii) --- .2142 .5687 
(i) vs. (iii) --- .9083 .6820 
(ii) vs. (iii) .2372 .3458 .9521 
 
 
(b) The H treatment 
(b1) Average Beliefs by the Row Subjects 
 
The contribution by 
the Set H subjects 
The (avg.) contribution 
by the Set M subjects 
The (avg.) contribution 
by the Set L subjects 
(i) Set H subjects --- 6.91 4.82 
(ii) Set M subjects 8.91 7.23 5.14 
(iii) Set L subjects 12.1 10.1 5.09 
Mann-Whitney Tests1   
(i) vs. (ii) --- .8574 .4283 
(i) vs. (iii) --- .0561* .4149 





 The numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and 






Table B.7: Relation between the Subjects’ Contribution Decisions and their Beliefs on the Other 
Four Members’ Contribution Decisions in the Public Good Regime 
(I) The Set H subjects 
Dependent Variable: The contribution amount of Set H subject i 
     
 The L treatment The H treatment 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
     
     
(a) Subject i’s belief on 
the average contribution 







     
(b) Subject i’s belief on 
the average contribution 
















     
# of observations 10 10 11 11 
F 4.50 1.59 1.83 .01 
Prob > F .0666 .2430 .2096 .9094 
Adjusted R-squared .2801 .0614 .0763 -.1094 
     
 
Notes: Linear regressions. In order to avoid a multi-colinearity issue, one of the two beliefs is used as an independent 
variable. The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 





(II) The Set M subjects 
Dependent Variable: The contribution amount of Set M subject i 
       
 The L treatment The H treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
(a) Subject i’s belief on 
the contribution of the 







       
(b) Subject i’s belief on 
the contribution of the 








       
(c) Subject i’s belief on 
the average contribution 




















       
# of observations 20 20 20 22 22 22 
F 5.19 23.64 2.15 2.40 80.10 12.14 
Prob > F .0352 .0001 .1602 .1372 .0000 .0023 
Adjusted R-squared .1806 .5437 .0569 .0624 .7902 .3466 
       
 
Notes: Linear regressions. In order to avoid a multi-colinearity issue, one of the three beliefs is used as an independent 
variable. The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 




(III) The Set L subjects 
Dependent Variable: The contribution amount of Set L subject i 
       
 The L treatment The H treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
(a) Subject i’s belief on 
the contribution of the 







       
(b) Subject i’s belief the 
average contribution of 








       
(c) Subject i’s belief the 
contribution of the other 





















       
# of observations 20 20 20 22 22 22 
F .00 21.02 6.97 2.90 19.60 40.32 
Prob > F .9772 .0002 .0166 .1041 .0003 .0000 
Adjusted R-squared -.0555 .5130 .2391 .0830 .4697 .6519 
       
 
Notes: Linear regressions. In order to avoid a multi-colinearity issue, one of the three beliefs is used as an independent 
variable. The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 





Table B.8: Average Allocations to the Lottery Account in the Lottery Contest Regime 
 
 
The L Treatment The H Treatment 
Average Allocations to the Lottery Accounts1 
(i) Set H subjects 6.80 (5) 20.0 (2) 
(ii) Set M subjects 5.90 (10) 11.3 (4) 
(iii) Set L subjects 6.10 (10) 3.25 (4) 
Mann-Whitney Tests2   
(i) = (ii) .9011 .1336 
(i) = (iii) .8989 .0565* 




 The numbers in parenthesis are the numbers of subjects. 
2
 The numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and 





Table B.9: Average Gini Coefficients by Regime (supplementing Fig. 4 of the paper and 
Appendix Fig. B.1) 
(a) For the subjects’ perceived distributions of payoffs 
We first calculated (i) each subject’s own perceived payoff as explained in the manuscript and (ii) the 
subject’s perceived four group members’ payoffs based on her contribution decision and beliefs about the 
four other members’ contributions. Here, each perceived payoff in the public good regime was calculated 
using Eq. (1); and each perceived payoff in the lottery contest regime was calculated using Eq. (2). We 
then calculated a Gini coefficient for each subject. 
 
 
The L treatment The H treatment 
(i) Public Good Regime
1
 .184 (50) .177 (55) 
(ii) Lottery Contest Regime
1
 .319 (25) .339 (10) 




 The numbers indicate the average Gini coefficients. The numbers in parenthesis indicate the numbers of 
subjects. 
2
 Mann-Whitney tests for (i) = (ii). 
 
(b) For the realized distributions of payoffs within groups 
We calculated a Gini coefficient for each group using the five members’ realized payoffs under their 
collectively selected regimes. 
 
 
The L treatment The H treatment 
(i) Public Good Regime
1
 .252 (10) .245 (11) 
(ii) Lottery Contest Regime
1
 .417 (5) .575 (2) 




 The numbers indicate the average Gini coefficients. The numbers in parenthesis indicate the numbers of 
groups. 
2




Table B.10: Average Risk Attitudes and Voting Decisions by Regime and Treatment 
(a) The L treatment 
 
Set H subjects Set M subjects Set L subjects 
    
(i) Those who voted for 







    
(ii) Those who voted 







p-value (two-sided)1 .6306 .4748 .2302 
     
 
(b) The H treatment 
 
Set H subjects Set M subjects Set L subjects 
    
(i) Those who voted 







    
(ii) Those who voted 







p-value (two-sided)1 .2290 .5848 1.000 




 Mann-Whitney test results for (i) = (ii). The numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate 





Table B.11: Voting Decisions, Beliefs on the Other Four Members’ Voting Decisions and 
Contribution Decisions to their Public Accounts 
(1) Relation between the Subjects’ Voting Decisions and Beliefs 
We examined how the conditional voting decisions of the subjects were dependent on their beliefs on the 
voting decisions of the other four members. 







      
Subject i’s voting decision  
under equal voting rule 
Subject i’s voting decisions  



















      
       
(a) Subject i’s belief on 
the number of votes in 
favor of a public good 
under equal voting rule 







---- ---- ---- 
       
(b) Subject i’s belief on 
the number of votes in 
favor of a public good 
under weighted voting 
rule ({0, 1, 2, 3, 4}) 





















       
# of observations 15 30 30 15 30 30 
F .01 12.35 9.66 .90 16.56 8.48 
Prob > F .9372 .0015 .0043 .3610 .0003 .0070 
Adjusted R-squared .0005 .2813 .2300 -.0075 .3492 .2051 
       
 
Notes: Linear regressions. The numbers in parenthesis indicate standard errors.  
1 
For example, the belief of a Set H subject is calculated by NM + NL. Here, NM (NL) are the belief of the Set H subject 
on the number of support for a public good by the Set M (Set L) subjects under the equal voting rule. Here, NM {0, 1, 
2}, and NL {0, 1, 2}. 











      
Subject i’s voting decision  
under equal voting rule 
Subject i’s voting decisions  



















      
       
(a) Subject i’s belief on 
the number of votes in 
favor of a public good 
under equal voting rule 







---- ---- ---- 
       
(b) Subject i’s belief on 
the number of votes in 
favor of a public good 
under weighted voting 
rule ({0, 1, 2, 3, 4}) 





















       
# of observations 13 26 26 13 26 26 
F .12 5.94 .98 .33 6.38 1.18 
Prob > F .7346 .0225 .3313 .5754 .0185 .2882 
Adjusted R-squared -.0791 .1651 -.0007 -.0588 .1772 .0071 
       
 
Notes: Linear regressions. The numbers in parenthesis indicate standard errors. 
1 
For example, the belief of a Set H subject is calculated by NM + NL. Here, NM (NL) are the belief of the Set H subject 
on the number of support for a public good by the Set M (Set L) subjects under the equal voting rule. Here, NM {0, 1, 
2}, and NL {0, 1, 2}. 





(2) Contribution Decisions under the Public Good Regime by Voter Type  
 
(2a) The L treatment 
 
Set H subjects Set M subjects Set L subjects 
    
Avg. Contributions    
    
(i) Those who voted for a 
public good under an 







    
(ii) Those who voted for a 
lottery contest under an 







Mann-Whitney test results for (i) = (ii)   
   p-value (two-sided)1 .3351 .9234 .2141 
     
 
(2b) The H treatment 
 
Set H subjects Set M subjects Set L subjects 
    
Avg. Contributions    
    
(i) Those who voted for a 
public good under an 







    
(ii) Those who voted for a 
lottery contest under an 







Mann-Whitney test results for (i) = (ii)   
p-value (two-sided)1 .0941* .0292** .2210 




 The numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and 




Table B.12: Summary of Results in the Additional Treatment 
(1) Individual Conditional Voting Decisions 
 
 
 Category of subjects 
    
Number of Votes Percentage 
 under EV1 under WV1 under EV under WV 
    
      
Set H subjects Public good 3 3 43% 43% 
 
Lottery contest 4 4 57% 57% 
Set M subjects Public good 9 8 64% 57% 
 
Lottery contest 5 6 36% 43% 
Set L subjects Public good 9 11 64% 79% 
 
Lottery contest 5 3 36% 21% 
  
    Subtotal Public good 21 22 60% 63% 
 
Lottery contest 14 13 40% 37% 
            
 
(2) Collective Vote Outcomes 
 






Number of groups  Percentage  
 
 







 actual hyp. actual hyp. actual hyp. 
 









Public good 3 6 2 3 75.0% 85.7% 66.7% 42.9% 
 Lottery contest 1 1 1 4 25.0% 14.3% 33.3% 57.1% 
 







 The numbers in the EV (WV) columns in Panel (1) indicate the ones of individual voting decisions under the 
equal (weighted) voting rule. The numbers in the EV (WV) columns in Panel (2) indicate the ones of collective outcomes 
under the equal (weighted) voting rule.
 2 
The columns labeled actual indicate vote outcomes in groups where the equal or 
weighted voting rule was randomly assigned in the experiment. 
3
 The numbers in the hyp. columns under EV (WV) are 
the sums of (a) the numbers of realized collective outcomes under EV (WV) and (b) the numbers of unrealized collective 





(3) Contribution Amounts as Percentages of their Endowments 
 
(i) Set H subjects (ii) Set M subjects  (iii) Set L subjects  
Average percentage 4.4% 13.0% 75.0% 
 
We compared the contribution amounts as percentages of their endowments between any two 
subsets of subjects (e.g., Set H versus Set L) by using Mann-Whitney tests. 
 
(i) Set H subjects 
vs. (ii) Set M subjects  
(i) Set H subjects 
vs. (iii) Set L subjects  
(ii) Set M subjects 
vs. (iii) Set L subjects  
p-value (two-sided) .2434 .0090*** .0039*** 
  
Notes: Mann-Whitney tests. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, 
respectively. 
  






   
 (i) Public Good Regime .192 (25) .281 (5) 
 (ii) Lottery Contest Regime .287 (10) .545 (2) 
 p-value (two-sided)1 .0176** .0528* 
   
 
 
Notes: Mann-Whitney test results for (i) = (ii). The numbers in parenthesis are the numbers of observations. *, **, and 




(5) Average Risk Attitudes by Voting Decision 
 
Set H subjects Set M subjects Set L subjects 
    
(i) Those who voted for a 
public good under an 







    
(ii) Those who voted for a 
lottery contest under an 







p-value (two-sided)1 1.000 .1376 .7132 
    
 
Notes: Mann-Whitney test results for (i) = (ii). The numbers in parenthesis are the numbers of observations. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
  
